Climate Change: Frequently Asked Questions
About the 2015 Paris Agreement
Jane A. Leggett
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
Richard K. Lattanzio
Specialist in Environmental Policy
June 28, 2017
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44609
Climate Change: Frequently Asked Questions About the 2015 Paris Agreement
Congressional Research Service
Summary
The Paris Agreement (PA) to address climate change internationally entered into force on
November 4, 2016. The United States is one of 149 Parties to the treaty; President Barack Obama
accepted the agreement rather than ratifying it with the advice and consent of the Senate. On June
1, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the
agreement and that his Administration would seek to reopen negotiations on the PA or on a new
“transaction.” Following the provisions of the PA, U.S. withdrawal could take effect as early as
November 2020.
Experts broadly agree that stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere to
avoid dangerous GHG-induced climate change would require concerted efforts by all large
emitting nations. The United States is the second largest emitter of GHG globally after China.
Toward this purpose, the PA outlines goals and a structure for international cooperation to slow
climate change and mitigate its impacts over decades to come.
The PA is subsidiary to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), which the United States ratified in 1992 with the advice and consent of the Senate
and which entered into force in 1994. The PA requires that nations submit pledges to abate their
GHG emissions, set goals to adapt to climate change, and cooperate toward these ends, including
mobilization of financial and other support. The negotiators intended the PA to be legally binding
on its Parties, though not all provisions in it are mandatory. Some are recommendations or
collective commitments to which it would be difficult to hold an individual Party accountable.
Key aspects of the agreement include:
Temperature goal. The PA defines a collective, long-term objective to hold the
GHG-induced increase in temperature to well below 2
o
Celsius (C) and to pursue
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5
o
C above the pre-industrial level. A
periodic “global stocktake” will assess progress toward the goals.
Single GHG mitigation framework. The PA establishes a process, with a
ratchet mechanism in five-year increments, for all countries to set and achieve
GHG emission mitigation pledges until the long-term goal is met. For the first
time under the UNFCCC, all Parties participate in a common framework with
common guidance, though some Parties are allowed flexibility in line with their
capacities. This largely supersedes the bifurcated mitigation obligations of
developed and developing countries that held the negotiations in often-
adversarial stasis for many years.
Accountability framework. To promote compliance, the PA balances
accountability to build and maintain trust (if not certainty) with the potential for
public and international pressure (“name-and-shame”). Also, the PA establishes a
compliance mechanism that will be expert-based and facilitative rather than
punitive. Many Parties and observers will closely monitor the effectiveness of
this strategy.
Adaptation. The PA also requires “as appropriate” that Parties prepare and
communicate their plans to adapt to climate change. Adaptation communications
will be recorded in a public registry.
Collective financial obligation. The PA reiterates the collective obligation in the
UNFCCC for developed country Parties to provide financial resources—public
and private—to assist developing country Parties with mitigation and adaptation
efforts. It urges scaling up of financing. The Parties agreed to set, prior to their
Climate Change: Frequently Asked Questions About the 2015 Paris Agreement
Congressional Research Service
2025 meeting, a new collective quantified goal for mobilizing financial resources
of not less than $100 billion annually to assist developing country Parties.
Obama Administration officials stated that the PA is not a treaty requiring Senate advice and
consent to ratification. President Obama signed an instrument of acceptance on behalf of the
United States on August 29, 2016, without submitting it to Congress. In 2015, Members of the
114
th
Congress introduced several resolutions (e.g., S.Res. 329, S.Res. 290, H.Res. 544,
S.Con.Res. 25) to express the sense that the PA should be submitted for the advice and consent of
the Senate. Additionally, resolutions were introduced in the House (H.Con.Res. 97, H.Con.Res.
105,H.Res. 218) to oppose the PA or set conditions on its signature or ratification by the United
States. None received further action. In the 115
th
Congress, a number of resolutions have also
been introduced to oppose or support U.S. participation in the PA (e.g., H.Con.Res. 55, H.Res. 85,
H.Res. 390, S.Con.Res. 17).
Beyond the Senate’s role in giving advice and consent to a treaty, Congress continues to exercise
its powers through authorizations and appropriations for related federal actions. Additionally,
numerous issues may attract congressional oversight, such as:
procedures for withdrawal;
foreign policy, technological, and economic implications of withdrawal;
possible objectives and provisions of renegotiation of the PA or of a new
“transaction” for cooperation internationally;
international rules and guidance to carry out the PA;
financial contributions and uses of finances mobilized; and
assessment of the effectiveness of other Parties’ efforts.
Climate Change: Frequently Asked Questions About the 2015 Paris Agreement
Congressional Research Service
Contents
The Paris Agreement in Context ...................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
What is the relationship of the PA to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol? .......................... 2
What are some key policy takeaways from Paris? .................................................................... 3
Requirements and Recommendations in the PA .............................................................................. 4
What is the purpose and long-term goal of the PA? .................................................................. 4
What does the PA require? ........................................................................................................ 6
Is the PA legally binding? .......................................................................................................... 7
Are PA requirements new for some Parties? ............................................................................. 8
What are the financial obligations, if any, for the United States in the PA? ........................... 10
What is the role of the Green Climate Fund in the PA? .......................................................... 10
Does the PA address “Loss and Damage”? .............................................................................. 11
Does the PA include or allow market-based mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions? ............ 11
What gases and sectors does the PA cover? ............................................................................ 12
Procedural Topics .......................................................................................................................... 13
How did the PA enter into force? ............................................................................................ 13
Signatures .......................................................................................................................... 14
Deposits of Instruments of Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession ................. 14
What actions did the United States take to join the PA? ......................................................... 14
Can a Party withdraw from the PA? ........................................................................................ 17
What are the roles of Congress with respect to the UNFCCC and the PA? ............................ 18
Countries’ Pledges to Contribute to GHG Emission Mitigation ................................................... 20
What did the United States pledge as its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)
to global GHG mitigation? ................................................................................................... 20
Could a Party rescind its NDC and submit a new one? ........................................................... 21
Can the United States meet its 2025 GHG reduction pledge? ................................................ 23
What did other major GHG-emitting countries pledge as their INDCs? ................................ 26
What if a Party does not meet its pledge? ............................................................................... 27
What effect might full compliance with the PA have on climate change? .............................. 28
Next Steps for the PA .................................................................................................................... 31
Tasks for all Parties ................................................................................................................. 31
Questions About Next Steps for the United States .................................................................. 32
Figures
Figure 1. Illustration of the U.S. NDC GHG Reduction Pledge .................................................... 21
Figure 2. Estimated Global Emission Levels Resulting from the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions in 2025 and 2030 Compared with Other Trajectories ...................... 30
Appendixes
Appendix. Schedule for Some Key Tasks Under the PA .............................................................. 34
Climate Change: Frequently Asked Questions About the 2015 Paris Agreement
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The Paris Agreement in Context
Introduction
Debate continues in the United States over whether and how the federal government should
address human-related climate change. A large majority of scientists and governments accept that
stabilizing the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere and avoiding further
GHG-induced climate change would require concerted effort by all major emitting countries.
1
Toward this end, 195 governments attending the 21
st
Conference of Parties (COP) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, France, adopted an
agreement in 2015 outlining goals and a structure for international cooperation to address climate
change and its impacts over decades to come.
2
The “Paris Agreement” (PA) is subsidiary to the
UNFCCC, a treaty that the United States ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate
3
and
that entered into force in 1994.
4
The PA entered into force on November 4, 2016, 30 days after at least 55 countries representing at
least 55% of officially reported global GHG emissions had deposited their instruments. On behalf
of the United States, President Obama signed an instrument of acceptance of the PA on August
29, 2016, and deposited it with U.N. Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon on September 3, 2016. As
of April 1, 2017, 142 additional nations have become Parties.
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States
from the PA.
5
He also stated that his Administration would seek to reopen negotiations on the PA
or on a new “transaction.” As discussed later, a Party may withdraw from the PA if it chooses to
do so. Article 28 allows a Party to give written notice of withdrawal to the U.N. depositary after
three years from the date on which the agreement has entered into force for that Party. The
withdrawal could take effect one year later. The United States could give notice of withdrawal as
soon as November 4, 2019, with withdrawal taking effect as soon as November 4, 2020. The
President did not indicate how the United States might participate in PA procedures until
withdrawal should take effect.
The PA creates a structure for nations to pledge to abate their GHG emissions, adapt to climate
change, and cooperate toward these ends, including financial and other support. The PA is
intended to be legally binding on Parties, though not all provisions are mandatory. The Parties in
1
For information on GHG emissions, and scientific understanding of how they influence climate change, see CRS
Report R43229, Climate Change Science: Key Points, by Jane A. Leggett.
2
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, “Adoption of the PA,” in Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its
Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by
the Conference of the Parties at Its Twenty-First Session, FCCC /CP/2015/10/Add.1. Decision 1/CP.21. 2016.
3
See President George H. W. Bush, letter to the Senate of the United States, Congressional Record, vol. 138
(September 8, 1992), p. 23902. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification in “Framework Convention
on Climate Change,” Congressional Record, vol. 138 (October 7, 1992), p. 33527. See also S. Treaty Doc. 102-38
(1992); S. Exec. Rept. 102-55. President Bush signed the instrument of ratification and submitted it to the United
Nations on October 13, 1992. Depositary notification C.N.148.1993.
4
For more information about the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and other related issues and decisions, see CRS Report
R40001, A U.S.-Centric Chronology of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, by Jane A.
Leggett.
5
The White House, “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord,” June 1, 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord.
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Paris also adopted a Decision to help implement the PA, and the specified processes to define
rules, methods, and other tasks are underway.
Members of Congress have expressed diverse views about the PA and may have questions about
its content, process, and obligations. This report is intended to answer some of the primary factual
and policy questions about the PA and its implications for the United States. It touches on nearly
all of the 29 articles in the 16-page agreement, as well as some in the accompanying decision of
the Parties to give effect to the PA. Other CRS products, available by request or on the CRS
website, may provide additional or deeper information on specific questions.
6
The UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement
The UNFCCC is a “framework” or “umbrella” treaty.
7
That is, Parties established an objective and general obligations
in the UNFCCC aimed at achieving its objective:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties
may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
8
Governments anticipated that the UNFCCC would require subsequent decisions, annexes, protocols, or other
agreements in order to achieve that objective.
The first subsidiary agreement to the UNFCCC was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. The
United States signed but did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol and so is not a Party to it. The Kyoto Protocol established
legally binding targets for 37 high-income countries and the European Union (EU) to reduce their GHG emissions on
average by 5% below 1990 levels during 2009-2012. It precluded GHG mitigation obligations for developing countries.
Most of the high-income Parties took on further targets for 2013-2020. The United States and a number of other
countries ultimately viewed the Kyoto Protocol as an unsuitable instrument for long-term cooperation because it
excluded GHG mitigation commitments from developing countries.
The PA is the second major subsidiary agreement under the UNFCCC. Many stakeholders expect the PA to
eventually replace the Kyoto Protocol as the primary subsidiary vehicle for process and actions under the UNFCCC.
No agreed vision for a transition from the Kyoto Protocol to the PA has been articulated, though some Parties have
urged that PA implementation take advantage of existing processes and rules of the Kyoto Protocol that have proven
successful.
What is the relationship of the PA to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol?
The UNFCCC is a “framework” treaty. (See text box.) The PA is subsidiary to the UNFCCC,
meaning that it is understood to exist within the scope and terms of the UNFCCC. As such, only
Parties to the UNFCCC are eligible to become Parties to the PA (PA Article 20.1).
9
6
See, for example, CRS Report R44761, Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris
Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Stephen P. Mulligan.
7
See discussion of umbrella or framework treaties under protocols on the website of the U.N. Treaty Collection,
“Definitions of Key Terms Used in the UN Treaty Collection,” https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=
overview/definition/page1_en.xml.
8
UNFCCC, Article 2.
9
The UNFCCC Secretariat reported that there were 197 Parties to the UNFCCC as of October 1, 2016. One example of
a state that has not deposited its ratification is the Cayman Islands. The United States does not believe Palestine
qualifies as a sovereign state and has submitted an official objection to its accession to the UNFCCC, according to a
letter from the Department of State’s Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs to Senator John Barrasso. (Copy
available upon request to CRS.)
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The PA is the outcome of the so-called Durban Mandate: The Conference of the Parties (COP) to
the UNFCCC agreed at its 2011 meeting in Durban, South Africa, “to develop a protocol, another
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all
Parties,”
10
which could be adopted by the COP in December 2015 and come into effect and be
implemented by 2020.
The PA may take advantage of many rules and processes that currently support Parties’
implementation of their UNFCCC obligations (e.g., to submit and review national GHG
inventories). UNFCCC processes will continue in parallel with new ones under the PA unless
Parties modify them. In developing implementation of the PA, the Parties may elect to make use
of existing UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol processes and agreed rules—such as to promote
adaptation to climate change or to account for emissions from land use change—rather than
beginning new ones. Some processes may be streamlined or merged under the related
agreements.
Abbreviations for Key UNFCCC Decisionmaking Bodies
COP: The Parties to the UNFCCC, as a body, are referred to as the “Conference of the Parties” (COP). It remains
the supreme decisionmaking body of the treaty.
CMA: The Parties to the PA will collectively be called the “Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to the PA”, or CMA.
APA: To prepare for the first CMA, the PA established the “Ad Hoc Working Group on the PA” (APA) to develop
guidance, processes, and recommendations for the CMA’s consideration and adoption.
What are some key policy takeaways from Paris?
While the PA is only 16 pages long, it contains a number of complex mechanisms—many of
which will require further definition by the negotiating Parties. Some experts and observers,
noting the PA’s largely procedural nature and lack of binding quantitative GHG obligations, have
questioned whether the PA marks significant change. Others note a number of substantive
differences from prior commitments, specifically for some Parties. Below are several ways in
which the PA embodies change under the UNFCCC.
Common process for all Parties. For the first time under the UNFCCC, all
Parties will participate in a common framework with common guidance,
although some Parties will have flexibility in line with their capacities. The
commonality largely supersedes the bifurcation into wealthier and developing
countries that has held the negotiations in often-adversarial stasis for many years.
Ratcheting process toward quantified objective. The PA defines a quantitative
(though collective) long-term objective to hold the GHG-induced increase in
temperature to well below 2
o
Celsius (C) and pursue efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5
o
C above the pre-industrial level. The PA establishes a
process, with a “ratchet mechanism” in five-year increments, for countries to set
and achieve GHG abatement targets until the long-term goal is met.
Greater subsidiarity. The PA embodies greater decentralization than, for
example, the Kyoto Protocol.
11
The PA increases reliance on decisionmaking and
strategy by individual countries or countries cooperating among themselves, not
10
COP, “Durban Mandate,” Decision 1/CP.17, December 2011, http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php.
11
For more on the Kyoto Protocol, see the UNFCCC website at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
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necessarily through central decision mechanisms. Examples of subsidiarity
include
the nationally determined contributions (pledges) that set countries’ GHG
targets, and
recognition that Parties will use market-based mechanisms (e.g., emissions
trading) to transfer emission reduction credits to meet their commitments.
12
Growing role of non-state entities. The negotiations leading to the Paris
conference and the PA grew more inclusive of non-state entities (including the
private sector) as observers and influencers. Parties recognized them as key
decisionmakers and implementers of activities expected to be necessary to
achieve the GHG abatement and increased resilience to climate change
envisioned in the PA. The government of France established a website for non-
state actors to make pledges and share information.
Moderate compliance incentives for all. For the first time, all countries agreed
to a single system for transparency, accountability, and public accessibility to
emissions and policy information to promote compliance with the PA. The
UNFCCC lacks universal obligations for transparency and review; the Kyoto
Protocol’s more intrusive non-compliance provisions may have discouraged
participation in commitments by some Parties. To promote compliance, the PA
works to balance accountability necessary to build and maintain trust (if not
certainty) with the potential for public and international pressure (“name-and-
shame”). A compliance mechanism is defined to be expert-based and facilitative
rather than punitive. Many Parties and observers will closely monitor the
effectiveness of this strategy.
Requirements and Recommendations in the PA
What is the purpose and long-term goal of the PA?
The PA states its purpose in Article 2: to enhance implementation of the UNFCCC and “to
strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change.” Parties to the UNFCCC adopted
the PA “in pursuit of the objective of the Convention”
13
—to stabilize GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system.
14
12
A market-based mechanism allows an entity with more emission reductions than it needs to meet its commitment to
sell or otherwise transfer some or part of its extra reduction credits to another entity, which may use those transferred
emission reduction credits to meet its emission commitments.
13
In the PA’s preamble, third paragraph.
14
For further information on climate change science and GHG emissions, see CRS Report R43229, Climate Change
Science: Key Points, by Jane A. Leggett. Discussion of how the UNFCCC’s objective relates to GHG emissions is
available in CRS Report R44092, Greenhouse Gas Pledges by Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, by Jane A. Leggett.
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GHG Increases and Global Average Temperature Increases
There is strong scientific agreement that climate change is occurring and that human activities—especially carbon
dioxide (CO
2
) emissions from the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas)—are responsible for most of the climate
change observed since the 1950s. Further human-related GHG emissions, and their accumulation in rising
atmospheric concentrations, would induce further climate change and would pose significant risks for many human
and natural systems.
15
The amount of global average temperature increase induced by rising GHG emissions is understood only within a
wide range, and the higher temperature end of that range is not well constrained by observational evidence. There is
broad—though not universal—scientific agreement that a doubling of pre-industrial CO
2
concentrations (from 280
parts per million) would likely result in global average warming of 1.5-4.5
o
C (2.7-8.1
o
F) over multiple centuries.
16
(Current CO
2
concentrations, not including other GHG, exceed 400 ppm globally.) From a geologic perspective, a
temperature increase in this range would be a large and rapid change in the earth’s system. For a comparison of
magnitudes, a multi-researcher analysis estimated a temperature difference of approximately 3-5
o
C between the Last
Glacial Maximum, when ice sheets were at their maximum extent—about 21,000 years ago—and the pre-industrial
surface global mean temperature.
17
Although stabilizing GHG concentrations would require eventually reducing human-related net
emissions to near zero, the UNFCCC did not state when or at what levels stabilization should
occur. The levels at which GHG atmospheric concentrations stabilize ultimately determines the
degree of GHG-induced temperature change.
The PA quantifies the intent of Parties in this regard in Article 2, stating that it aims to
[hold] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and
impacts of climate change.
Article 2 also calls for, inter alia, increasing the ability to adapt to climate change and making
financial flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient
development.
In order to achieve the PA’s “long-term temperature goal,” Parties aim to make their GHG
emissions peak as soon as possible and then reduce them rapidly “so as to achieve a balance
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the
second half of this century.”
18
In other words, the PA envisions achieving net zero anthropogenic
GHG emissions within a defined time period. While this is arguably synonymous with the
UNFCCC’s objective of stabilizing GHG atmospheric concentrations, the PA puts a time frame
on the objective for the first time. The objective, however, is collective. It remains unclear
whether the PA could hold an individual Party accountable if the collective objective were not
met.
15
See, among other sources, National Research Council, “Climate Change: Evidence, Impacts, and Choices,” 2011,
http://nas-sites.org/americasclimatechoices/more-resources-on-climate-change/climate-change-lines-of-evidence-
booklet/.
16
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group 1, “Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis,” 2013, http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/.
17
Jansen, Eystein et al., “Chapter 6: Paleoclimate,” in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution
of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge,
UK and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/
ch6.html. A more recent reference is J. D. Annan and J. C. Hargreaves, “A New Global Reconstruction of Temperature
Changes at the Last Glacial Maximum,” Climate Past, vol. 9, no. 1 (February 13, 2013), pp. 367-376.
18
PA, Article 4.
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What does the PA require?
The PA establishes a single framework under which all Parties shall:
communicate every five years and undertake Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) to mitigate GHG emissions, reflecting the “highest
possible ambition”;
participate in a single “transparency framework” that includes communicating
Parties’ GHG inventories and implementation of their obligations—including
financial support provided or received—not less than biennially (with exceptions
to a few least-developed states); and
be subject to international review of their implementation.
The requirements are procedural. There are no legal targets and timetables for reducing GHG
emissions.
All Parties will eventually be subject to common procedures and guidelines. However, developed
country Parties
19
should provide NDCs stated as economy-wide, absolute GHG reduction targets,
while developing country Parties are exhorted to enhance their NDCs and move toward similar
targets over time in light of their national circumstances. Further flexibility in the transparency
framework is allowed to developing countries (depending on their capacities) regarding the
scope, frequency, and detail of their reporting. Many observers consider this flexibility key to
gaining the participation of many low-income countries, while some observers note that the
flexibility may allow reticent Parties to resist more stringent commitments.
20
The administrative
Secretariat of the UNFCCC will record the NDCs and other key reports in a public registry.
The PA also requires “as appropriate” that Parties prepare and communicate their plans to adapt to
climate change. Adaptation communications, too, will be recorded in a public registry.
The PA reiterates the obligation in the UNFCCC for developed country Parties to provide public
and private financial support to assist developing country Parties with mitigation and adaptation
efforts. It also urges scaling up of financing. The Parties agreed to set, prior to their 2025 meeting,
a new collective quantified goal for mobilizing financial resources of not less than $100 billion
annually to assist developing country Parties.
21
Financing is not restricted to public funds, and
many stakeholders expect that most would flow through private investment.
The PA permits Parties to participate in cooperative approaches (implicitly, emissions markets)
that “involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes.” Additional mechanisms
for cooperative activities, and efforts to incentivize private sector participation, are identified.
Further, the PA establishes a committee that will address compliance issues under the PA in a
facilitative and non-punitive manner. Finally, the PA contains provisions for voluntary withdrawal
by Parties.
19
The terms developed and developing country Parties were not defined in the UNFCCC. While Parties arguably
generally understood which countries fell into which category, particularly considering those listed as “developed” in
Annex I of the treaty, the absence of definition or criteria arguably contributes to the challenge of countries graduating
to higher levels of effort or contribution as they develop.
20
An example of cautious observations is Xiawan Liu, “The Paris Agreement: Miracle or Mirage?,” Georgetown
Environmental Law Review, February 16, 2016, https://gelr.org/2016/02/16/the-paris-agreement-miracle-or-mirage/.
21
For more information, see section titled “What are the financial obligations, if any, for the United States in the PA?”
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Is the PA legally binding?
The Department of State in 2016 communicated to Congress that, in its view, some elements of
the PA are legal and binding: “Once the Agreement enters into force for the United States, the
legally binding provisions of the Agreement … will apply to the United States.”
22
Negotiators intended the PA to be a legal instrument, though not all provisions in it are
mandatory. Some are recommendations or collective commitments to which it would be difficult
to hold an individual Party accountable.
As explained in CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon
U.S. Law:
An international agreement is generally presumed to be legally binding in the absence of
an express provision indicating its nonlegal nature. State Department regulations
recognize that this presumption may be overcome when there is “clear evidence, in the
negotiating history of the agreement or otherwise, that the parties intended the
arrangement to be governed by another legal system.” Other factors that may be relevant
in determining whether an agreement is nonlegal in nature include the form of the
agreement and the specificity of its provisions.”
The PA was negotiated as a subsidiary agreement to the UNFCCC, which is a legally binding
treaty among its Parties under international law.
23
Pursuant to enhancing implementation of the
UNFCCC, the negotiators adopted the Durban Mandate for “a protocol, another legal instrument
or an agreed outcome with legal force” applicable to all Parties.
24
As negotiations under the
Durban Mandate neared their resolution, many Parties stated their intentions that the PA be
legally binding in many respects.
25
The text contains provisions consistent with the form of an
agreement intended to be governed by international law, such as entry into force, the depositary
for the agreement, dispute settlement, and withdrawal from the agreement.
26
As discussed above,
22
Letter from Julia Frifeld, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Senator Bob Corker,
Chair, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 16, 2016.
23
See footnote 3. For additional discussion of the elements necessary for an agreement to be binding under
international law, see CRS, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate. A
Study Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January 2001, pp. 50-53. Notably, “a paramount
principle of international law is pacta sunt servanda—that treaties must be kept. Treaties, therefore, are binding under
international law” (p. 50). Nonetheless, some written understandings are considered non-legally binding. Footnote 30
of the CRS study spells out the Department of State’s guidelines for internal purposes for determining the elements of a
legally binding international agreement. Primary among these is whether the parties intend to be bound under
international law.
24
UNFCCC, “Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,” Decision
1/CP.17, p. 2, March 15, 2012.
25
See, among many negotiators’ statements, John Kerry, “COP21 Press Availability with Special Envoy Todd Stern,”
December 7, 2015:
[W]e are supportive … that [the agreement] would involve a legally binding agreement in many
respects. There would be legally binding requirements in this approach to put forward your
mitigation, your target, your INDC to include the kind of information that makes it intelligible and
understandable that would include requirements for producing inventories, for reporting on your
progress toward your target, for being reviewed, for various rules that would apply to how targets,
how emissions are counted and the like. But not the target itself.
See also European Commission, “Climate Action: Paris Agreement,” http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/
negotiations/paris/index_en.htm; China Climate Change Info-Net, “China Urges Implementation of Historic Climate
Deal,” December 13, 2015, http://en.ccchina.gov.cn/Detail.aspx?newsId=57834&TId=96; and Dan Bodansky, “The
Legal Character of the Paris Agreement: A Primer,” Opinio Juris, November 28, 2015.
26
Bodansky, “The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement.” See also Department of State, “International Documents
(continued...)
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Congressional Research Service 8
the PA also contains specific obligations intended to be binding on Parties to it. Many of the
mandatory obligations appear to be distinguishable by use of the imperative verb shall, although
some are qualified in ways (e.g., “as appropriate”) that soften the potential obligation. Not all
provisions in the PA are mandatory. Some provisions exhort but would not legally require Parties
(individually or collectively) or the Secretariat to undertake actions or to conform to norms under
the PA. Some provisions are facilitative.
The principal mandatory provisions for individual Parties are procedural. Among the most
important of these is PA Article 4.2:
[E]ach Party shall prepare, communicate, and maintain successive nationally determined
contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation
measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.
While the PA obligates Parties to submit NDCs to mitigate GHG emissions—with certain
characteristics and frequency of those submissions identified in the PA or to be determined in
guidance of the Parties—the contents of the NDCs are not intended to be enforceable under the
PA. The Department of State has stated:
Even after the United States deposits its instrument and the Agreement enters into force,
the U.S. 26-28 percent contribution will not, by the terms of the Agreement, be legally
binding. Neither Article 4, which addresses mitigation efforts, nor any other provision of
the Agreement obligates a Party to achieve its contribution.
27
Article 4.8 requires that Parties’ communications of their NDCs shall provide the information
necessary for clarity, transparency, and understanding in accordance with guidance on reporting
and NDCs to be developed by the APA for adoption by the CMA in its first session. Each Party
must communicate an NDC every five years. Each shall also account for its NDC post-
submission in accordance with CMA guidance, including reporting on its progress in achieving its
NDC.
Each Party must also, “as appropriate,” engage in adaptation planning processes and
implementation of adaptation-related actions.
While the PA contains many additional requirements, such as to provide “continuous and
enhanced support … to developing country Parties” for required adaptation efforts, those
provisions are collective obligations. There is currently no mechanism by which an individual
Party could be held accountable for collective shortcomings.
Are PA requirements new for some Parties?
The PA contains a multitude of obligations for governments that are Parties to it, but few experts
have suggested that there are substantive, legal obligations for the United States in the PA beyond
those in the UNFCCC. The Obama Administration articulated its view: “The elements that are
binding are consistent with already approved previous agreements.”
28
Some of the PA’s provisions are, arguably, new obligations for other Parties, such as the (mostly
low-income) Parties not listed in the UNFCCC’s Annex I. One example is the provision requiring
all Parties to ultimately be held to common transparency and review guidelines.
(...continued)
of a Non-Legally Binding Character,” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65728.pdf.
27
Frifeld, letter to Corker.
28
Department of State, “Background Briefing on the Paris Climate Agreement,” December 12, 2015.
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All Parties to the UNFCCC,
29
including the United States, have a host of obligations under the
treaty. These existing obligations require Parties to:
inventory, report, and control their human-related GHG emissions, including
from land use;
cooperate in preparing to adapt to climate change;
seek to mobilize financial resources; and
assess and review, through the COP, the effective implementation of the
UNFCCC, including the commitments therein.
The industrialized countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC, including the United States, took
on stronger obligations than other countries with regard to reporting, communicating, and
international review. In addition, the then-highest income countries, listed in Annex II of the
UNFCCC, also agreed to provide financial, technological, and capacity-building assistance to
help developing country Parties meet their obligations.
For countries not listed in Annex I, some obligations under the PA will be new or stronger than
those under the UNFCCC. The PA and Decision establish a single framework under which all
Parties would:
communicate every five years and undertake NDCs to mitigate GHG emissions,
reflecting the “highest possible ambition” (Article 4.3),
participate in a single transparency framework that includes communicating their
GHG inventories and implementation of their obligations—including financial
support provided or received—not less than biennially (with exceptions to a few
least developed states), and
be subject to international review of their implementation.
The United States, as a Party listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC, has already taken on the PA’s
general obligations under the UNFCCC. In contrast, Parties not listed in Annex I were not subject
to UNFCCC provisions that required detailed reporting of policies and measures and their
effects,
30
among other requirements. Additional provisions subjected Annex I Parties to certain
reviews not applicable to other Parties.
31
The PA expands reporting and reviews for non-Annex I
Parties.
All Parties to the PA will eventually be subject to common procedures and guidelines under it.
However, while developed country Parties
32
must provide NDCs stated as economy-wide,
absolute GHG reduction targets, developing country Parties are exhorted to enhance their NDCs
(i.e., deepen their GHG reductions) and move toward similar targets over time in light of their
national circumstances. Article 4 states that “each Party’s successive nationally determined
contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined
29
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1771, p. 107; and depositary notifications C.N.148.1993. As of August 1, 2016,
the UNFCCC Secretariat reported that there were 197 Parties to the UNFCCC.
30
UNFCCC, Articles 4.2(b), 12.2, and 12.3.
31
UNFCCC, Articles 4.2 (d) and 10.2(b)
32
The terms developed and developing country Parties were not defined in the UNFCCC. While Parties arguably
generally understood which countries fell into which category, particularly considering those listed in Annex I of the
treaty to be “developed,” the absence of definition or criteria arguably contributes to the challenge of countries
graduating to higher levels of effort or contribution as they developed.
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Congressional Research Service 10
contribution.” Many view this as a ratchet mechanism that would result in progressively deeper
GHG emission reductions. This may be more an expectation than an obligation.
33
What are the financial obligations, if any, for the United States in
the PA?
Article 9 of the PA reiterates the obligation in the UNFCCC for developed country Parties,
including the United States, to mobilize financial support to assist developing country Parties
with mitigation and adaptation efforts (Article 9.1). Also, for the first time under the UNFCCC,
the PA encourages all Parties to provide financial support voluntarily, regardless of their
economic standing (Article 9.2). The agreement states that developed country Parties should take
the lead in mobilizing climate finance and that the mobilized resources may come from a wide
variety of sources—noting the significant role of public funds. It adds that the mobilization of
climate finance “should represent a progression beyond previous efforts” (Article 9.3).
The COP Decision to adopt the PA uses exhortatory language to restate the collective pledge by
developed countries in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord of $100 billion annually by 2020 and calls
for continuing this collective mobilization through 2025. In addition, the Parties to the COP
agreed to set, prior to their 2025 meeting, a new collective quantified goal for mobilizing
financial resources of not less than $100 billion annually to assist developing country Parties.
34
The Decision strongly urges developed country Parties to scale up their current financial
support—in particular to significantly increase their support for adaptation. The Decision
recognizes that “enhanced support” will allow for “higher ambition” in the actions of developing
country Parties (1/CP.21§114). This is a collective commitment to which it would be difficult to
hold an individual Party accountable.
What is the role of the Green Climate Fund in the PA?
The Decision recognizes the Green Climate Fund (GCF)
35
as one of the entities entrusted with the
operation of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC (1/CP.21§58) and, thus, as one channel
through which official UNFCCC financing may flow. In general, the Decision recognizes that
adequate and predictable financial resources will flow from, inter alia, “public and private,
bilateral and multilateral sources, such as the Green Climate Fund, and alternative sources”
(1/CP.21§54).
The GCF is a multilateral trust fund intended to operate at arm’s length from the UNFCCC with
an independent board, trustee, and secretariat. The GCF was proposed during the 2009 COP in
Copenhagen, Denmark; accepted by Parties as an “operating entity of the financial mechanism
33
Negotiators pay careful attention to specific words and their potential indication of legal obligations under an
agreement, and this has been visible in revisions of the drafts leading to the final PA. The use of shall, as the imperative
tense, tends to be associated with binding obligations, while will is in the future tense, which may be interpreted more
as a predication rather than obligation. The use of shall, however, may be altered by modifiers around it, such as as
appropriate or generally, or by choice of verb, such as aim, which may imply effort or intention but not necessarily
hitting the target. Whether a particular provision would be legally binding, however, would likely be debated and
ultimately decided by the Parties and the dispute settlement and compliance proceedings under the PA and UNFCCC
(its umbrella convention).
34
COP Decision 1/CP.21§53.
35
See CRS In Focus IF10382, The Green Climate Fund (GCF), by Richard K. Lattanzio. See also CRS In Focus
IF10397, The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI): Budget Authority and Request, FY2010 - FY2018, by Richard
K. Lattanzio.
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Congressional Research Service 11
under Article 11 of the Convention” during the 2011 COP in Durban, South Africa; and made
operational in the summer of 2014. The governing instrument for the GCF states that the GCF is
to be “accountable to and function under the guidance of the Conference of Parties”
(3/CP.17§A4)—that is, similar in legal structure to the Global Environment Facility—as opposed
to “accountable to and function under the guidance and authority of the Conference of Parties”
(i.e., similar in legal structure to the Adaptation Fund).
Does the PA address “Loss and Damage”?
A key issue for some Parties in the PA negotiations was “loss and damage” due to climate change.
Parties that perceived themselves as vulnerable to climate change have long sought commitments
from the historically high-emitting countries to provide liability or funds to compensate for loss
and damage that vulnerable Parties may suffer. The UNFCCC Secretariat defined loss and
damage, at least temporarily, as “the actual and/or potential manifestation of impacts associated
with climate change in developing countries that negatively affect human and natural systems.”
36
Loss and damage may occur even with preparation and adaptation to anticipated climate change.
The United States and other historically high-emitting nations opposed new programs or
commitments addressing loss and damage.
In response to the interests of many countries, the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and
Damage (“Warsaw Mechanism”) was agreed under the UNFCCC in 2013 at COP19 in Decision
3/CP.19. The Warsaw Mechanism is procedural in nature.
Despite strenuous negotiations, the UNFCCC Parties did not adopt proposals that could have
established legal remedies—such as liability or compensation for loss and damage. Instead, the
negotiators agreed in Article 8 to continue the existing process under the authority of the CMA to
explore cooperation and facilitation that could include early warning systems, emergency
preparedness, comprehensive risk assessment and management, and improved resilience.
Does the PA include or allow market-based mechanisms to reduce
GHG emissions?
Article 6 of the PA recognizes that Parties may use market-based mechanisms that generate and
allow international transfer of GHG reduction credits that can be used to meet NDCs. The
Decision calls for a work program that would govern market mechanisms and the additional
mechanisms under the PA.
Article 6 covers four distinct (but not mutually exclusive) opportunities for Parties to the PA to
voluntarily cooperate to mitigate GHG emissions in ways that can lead to transfers of emission
reduction credits between Parties:
Cooperative approaches, acknowledging that Parties may choose, on a voluntary
basis, to cooperate in the implementation of their NDCs.
37
This provision may be
read as broad, potentially encompassing the other means included in the article as
well as additional approaches that may emerge through the duration of the PA.
36
UNFCCC Secretariat, “A Literature Review on the Topics in the Context of Thematic Area 2 of the Work
Programme on Loss and Damage: A Range of Approaches to Address Loss and Damage Associated with the Adverse
Effects of Climate Change: Note by the Secretariat,” November 15, 2012.
37
UNFCCC Article 3 previously authorized Parties to cooperate.
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Transfers of mitigation outcomes between Parties are recognized as a means to
meet Parties’ NDCs. “Internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” will need
to be consistent with future CMA guidance on their GHG accounting, intended to
ensure “environmental integrity”—that is, that there is no double counting or
other misaccounting that could undermine the abatement pledged by Parties. The
language is explicit that the transfers occur under the authorities of the
participating Parties, not the CMA. This contrasts with the provisions in the
Kyoto Protocol that required exchanges of credits to occur under—and with the
prior approval of—Kyoto-established institutions (i.e., the Clean Development
Mechanism).
A mechanism to contribute to mitigation and support sustainable development is
established under the CMA that could establish credit for cooperative programs
that mitigate GHG emissions and development of a Party. Those credits could be
used to meet one Party’s NDC. A share of the proceeds from activities under this
mechanism will help defray administrative expenses and assist developing
countries.
A framework for non-market approaches is defined but not “established.” The
provisions make clear that the framework should promote sustainable
development; synergies across mitigation, adaptation, finance, and technology
transfer; and capacity-building, along with additional purposes. But the nature
and processes of this framework remain to be developed.
Collectively, these four mechanisms encompass a diversity of interests and preferred approaches
among Parties. They may be viewed as broadly inclusive, not suggesting preferences in the PA for
one approach over another.
What gases and sectors does the PA cover?
The PA is silent regarding the anthropogenic gases and sectors potentially covered, leaving the
scope bounded by the UNFCCC’s scientific definition of what constitutes a GHG.
38
The
UNFCCC includes all human-related GHGs and all sectoral sources of them. It also includes
removals of GHGs from the atmosphere by “sinks” and reservoirs, including land uses (i.e.,
photosynthesis by vegetation and soils). Article 5 explicitly exhorts Parties to “reduce emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation, and conservation (REDD+), including through results-
based payments.”
To support the PA negotiations, most UNFCCC Parties submitted Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs) during 2015, constituting country-driven intentions of what
each would do to address GHG emission mitigation and, in some cases, adaptation.
39
Each Party
decided and communicated which GHG and sectors it covered in its INDC, and a wide diversity
of scopes were identified across nations. A continuing task for the UNFCCC Secretariat will be to
38
The UNFCCC does not name specific GHG in its definitions. The Kyoto Protocol listed CO
2
, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride as covered GHGs (and constituted a topic of much
negotiation). Nitrogen trifluoride was added for the period 2013-2020. However, the gases covered by the Kyoto
Protocol have no direct bearing on what Parties to the PA may count or mandate.
39
The United States submitted its INDC on March 31, 2015, available at http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/
Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.
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try to put those INDCs into a common metric and assess the aggregate effects of the INDCs. It
began this task with an analysis released in October 2015
40
updated on May 2, 2016.
41
The COP Decision giving effect to the PA requested the APA to develop guidance for the CMA to
consider and adopt at its first session. The process of negotiating guidance will likely consider
methods and approaches for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic GHG emissions and
sinks in the NDCs. (See paragraphs 28 and 27 of Decision 1/CP.21.) This process will build on
extensive but flexible guidance already adopted under the UNFCCC for estimating and reporting
GHG inventories, but challenging issues—such as reporting of sinks—may arise as they have in
the past.
Procedural Topics
How did the PA enter into force?
In accordance with Article 21 of the PA, the agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016,
on the 30
th
day after at least 55 countries representing at least 55% of officially reported global
GHG emissions deposited their instruments. Entry into force of the PA entailed four steps by
Parties:
1. Signature by individual national governments;
42
2. Governments’ processes of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession,
according to their domestic laws and practices;
3. Deposition of those instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or
accession with the United Nations depositary; and
4. Passing a threshold of 55 countries, representing at least 55% of GHG emissions,
that have deposited their instruments.
The threshold in step 4, above, was passed on October 5, 2016, initiating the 30-day clock. The
PA has legal force only for those nations that are Parties to it—those that have deposited their
instruments.
The Durban Mandate for the PA envisioned the PA taking effect in 2020. The entry into force four
years sooner than anticipated poses some challenges to the Parties. In particular—as discussed
later in “Next Steps for the PA”—Parties are pressed to develop and adopt many procedures and
methods to guide their compliance with the PA’s provisions. Some procedures were envisioned in
the PA as being ready for adoption in the first COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the PA
(CMA). That first meeting began in November 2016 rather than in 2020, and development of
rules and procedures are ongoing.
40
UNFCCC, “Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: Note by
the Secretariat,” October 30, 2015, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf.
41
UNFCCC, “Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: An Update,” May 2, 2016,
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/eng/02.pdf.
42
The EU may also become a Party to the PA, as it is to the UNFCCC. This report includes the EU when it refers to
“nations” or “countries.”
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Signatures
More than 170 governments (including the United States and EU) signed the agreement on April
22, 2016.
43
This set a new record for signatures on a U.N. treaty in a single day. As of June 1,
2017, the PA had received 195 signatures.
44
Signatories included all major emitting countries and
the EU; only Nicaragua and Syria had not signed. The PA remained open for signature until April
21, 2017.
Signature alone did not trigger entry into force of the agreement, but was a first step in the
process for a UNFCCC Party to become Party to the PA. The PA is explicit in Article 20 that
signature is further subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by the signing state
or regional economic integration organization (REIO) before the agreement has legal force on
that signatory. After signing, a state that seeks to become Party to the PA proceeds with its own
domestic processes,
45
defined by its laws, to ratify, accept, approve, or (for nations that do not
sign before April 21, 2017) accede to the agreement.
Finally, to become a Party, a national government or an REIO (e.g., the EU) must deposit an
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the U.N. depositary. On April
22, 2016, 15 nations deposited their ratifications with the United Nations, and others pledged to
do so as quickly as possible.
Deposits of Instruments of Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession
By October 5, 2016, 72 nations had deposited their ratifications, acceptances, or approvals of the
PA, accounting for more than 56% of global GHG emissions, passing the threshold for the PA to
enter into force. In synchrony, the United States and China deposited their instruments with U.N.
Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon on September 3, 2016. As of June 23, 2017, 149 Parties had
joined the PA, including the major emitters Brazil, the EU and seven of its members, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and Ukraine. Additional Parties represent a
spectrum of emissions and economies, from Albania to Vanuatu. Among the top 20 emitting
countries, only Iran and Russia are not yet Parties. In 2016, Russia pledged to join the PA as
quickly as possible.
What actions did the United States take to join the PA?
The United States completed a number of steps necessary to become a Party to the PA. First, the
United States became a Party to the umbrella treaty, the UNFCCC, when it entered into force in
1994. The United States participated as a UNFCCC Party in the 21
st
meeting of the COP when it
adopted the PA by consensus, on December 12, 2015.
The United States became a signatory of the PA when Secretary of State John Kerry signed the
PA on behalf of the United States on April 22, 2016. On August 29, 2016, President Obama, on
behalf of the United States, signed an instrument of acceptance of the PA, effectively providing
U.S. consent to be bound by the PA. He deposited that instrument of acceptance directly with
43
UNFCCC Secretariat, “April 22 Paris Agreement Signing in New York Over 130 Countries Confirm Attendance:
Update to Event, Guide to Subsequent Ratification,” April 7, 2016, http://newsroom.unfccc.int/paris-agreement/april-
22-paris-agreement-signing-ceremony-in-new-york/.
44
The UNFCCC Secretariat provides a tally of instrument deposits and cumulative GHG emissions covered at
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.
45
Though it may occur that a state ratifies, accepts, approves, or accedes without going through its established
domestic processes, discussion of this exception and its implications is beyond the scope of this report.
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U.N. Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon on September 3, 2016. The United States became a Party
to the PA when it entered into force on November 4, 2016.
Whether the United States legally could—or should—have become a Party to the PA as a treaty
with Senate advice and consent, or as an executive agreement,
46
has been a matter of interest for
some in Congress and the public. The PA is intended by its negotiators to be an international
treaty as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
47
Nonetheless, under U.S. law,
the term treaty refers to agreements that receive Senate advice and consent in conformance with
Article II of the Constitution. President Obama accepted the PA as an executive agreement rather
than seeking the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify it; executive agreements may be made
pursuant to congressional authorization, pursuant to authority granted to the executive in a prior
treaty, or “solely on the basis of the constitutional authority of the President.”
48
This process has
been used for other international treaties. At least one other international environmental
agreement, the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury, was entered into as an executive
agreement.
49
The State Department’s Handbook on Treaties and Other International Agreements identifies
considerations for the executive branch’s determination of the type of agreement and the
constitutionally authorized procedures to be followed by the United States in joining an
agreement.
50
The determination depends on a number of considerations, including whether the PA
was negotiated pursuant to a ratified treaty (e.g., the UNFCCC), its content and importance,
whether it requires additional legislative authorizations for the United States to comply, related
congressional resolutions, and other factors. As examples of application of these considerations,
if the PA were to contain new legal obligations for the United States, or if the United States were
unable to meet its obligations without additional authority from Congress, those factors would
favor regarding the PA as requiring congressional action. Senior officials of the executive branch
asserted that the PA is an executive agreement that does not require submission to the Senate
because of the way it is structured.
51
State Department officials stated that they had “a standard
State Department exercise that [they were] going through for authorizing an executive agreement,
which this is.”
52
The State Department’s Handbook states, following its listing of considerations, that “[i]n
determining whether any international agreement should be brought into force as a treaty or as an
international agreement other than a treaty, the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any
46
For more information, see CRS Report RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by
Michael John Garcia.
47
Bodansky, “The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement,” Social Science Research Network, March 22, 2016,
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2735252; David A. Wirth, “Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code:
United States Law and the Paris Agreement,” Climate Law, vol. 6 (2016), p. 152.
48
Department of State, Handbook on Treaties and Other International Agreements (The C-175 Handbook),
Supplementary Handbook on the C-175 Process: Routine Science and Technology Agreements, January 2001,
§721.2.b. This paragraph describes the constitutional bases for international agreements other than treaties.
49
U.N. Treaty Collection, Minamata Convention on Mercury, Chapter XXVII.17. The U.S. letter of acceptance was
deposited on November 6, 2013: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
17&chapter=27&clang=_en.
50
Department of State, Handbook on Treaties and Other International Agreements, §721.3.
51
Department of State, Background Briefing, December 12, 2015.
52
Department of State, “Senior State Department Official on the Paris Agreement Signing Ceremony,” press release,
April 20, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/256415.htm. See also Ashley Alman and Daniel Marans,
“Barack Obama Praises Climate Change Agreement,” Huffington Post, December 12, 2015,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-paris-climate-agreement_us_566c8cf1e4b0fccee16ed503.
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invasion or compromise of the constitutional powers of the Senate, Congress as a whole, or the
President.”
53
It also states that consultations on the type of agreement to be used “will be held
with congressional leaders and committees as may be appropriate.”
54
The 2016 White House
statement upon deposit of the U.S. instrument of acceptance provided little insight into the
decision.
55
The Senate Legislative Counsel in 1975 stated its position that “the scope of presidential authority
to make executive agreements is unclear.” Congress has interests in both the substance of the
agreement and protecting its constitutional authorities. In 2015, Members of the 114
th
Congress
introduced several resolutions (e.g., S.Res. 329, S.Res. 290, H.Res. 544, S.Con.Res. 25) to
express the sense that the PA should be submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate.
Additionally, resolutions were introduced in the House (H.Con.Res. 97, H.Con.Res. 105, H.Res.
218) to oppose the PA or set conditions on its signature or ratification by the United States. None
received further action. In the 115
th
Congress, a number of resolutions have also been introduced
to oppose or support U.S. participation in the PA (e.g., H.Con.Res. 55, H.Res. 85, H.Res. 390,
S.Con.Res. 17). Again, no further action has occurred.
The 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution (S.Res. 98, 105
th
Congress, adopted 98-0) expressed the Sense
of the Senate opposing an agreement pursuant to the UNFCCC that would
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the
Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing
Country Parties within the same compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.
The PA could be seen to satisfy the first clause, as all Parties have the same obligation to submit
NDCs to abate GHG emissions, with all Parties pledging to achieve their contributions by 2030.
(The U.S. opted for a target date of 2025.) The substance of the NDCs is not binding for any
Party. In the second clause, determining whether the agreement could cause “serious harm” to the
U.S. economy would require analysis and judgment.
56
Stakeholders have weighed in with their views regarding the appropriate legal form and process
for the PA in the United States. Some commentators consider that the PA is appropriately an
executive agreement because it does not contain new, specific legal obligations for the United
States beyond those in the UNFCCC and already authorized under U.S. law.
57
The United States
and other Parties to the UNFCCC accepted legally binding obligations when they ratified the
UNFCCC, including addressing GHG emissions (Articles 4.1 and 4.2), preparation to adapt to
climate change (Article 4.1), financial assistance to developing countries (Articles 4.3-4.5),
international cooperation and support (Article 4.1), and regular reporting of emissions and actions
53
U.S. Department of State, Handbook on Treaties and Other International Agreements.
54
Ibid., 721.4(c).
55
White House, “President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris Agreement,” September 3, 2016,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states-formally-enters-paris-agreement.
56
CRS is aware of only one study that has been cited as assessing the potential costs of the PA in the United States.
The study has not been peer reviewed, and its authors have cautioned about selectively using results, mischaracterizing
its purpose and design, and misusing the study.
57
See, among others, ThinkProgress. “No, The Paris Climate Agreement Isn’t Binding. Here’s Why That Doesn’t
Matter,” Medium, December 14, 2015; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Paris Climate Talks Q&A,” accessed
August 16, 2016; Gwynne Taraska and Ben Bovanick, “The Authority for U.S. Participation in the Paris Climate
Agreement,” Climate Adviser, July 2015.
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(Article 12) with international review (Article 4.2, 7). Some commentators note that the
obligation to submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is procedural, because the
Parties would not have a legal obligation to comply with the content of the NDC. In other words,
a Party could be held to account under the compliance provisions of the PA for not submitting an
NDC, but it could not be held accountable under the compliance provisions should that Party not,
for example, achieve a GHG emissions target it specified in its NDC. (See discussion in “Are PA
requirements new for some Parties?”)
Other commentators argued that the PA is a treaty that should have been submitted to the
Senate.
58
Some gave reasons such as historical practice, the potential costs and benefits, or other
factors.
59
At least one commentator argued that the PA could, in future decades, result in stronger
obligations for the United States than the Senate anticipated when it gave its consent to ratifying
the UNFCCC.
60
Can a Party withdraw from the PA?
The PA—typical of modern international agreements, including the UNFCCC—includes
provisions for Parties to withdraw if they choose to do so. Article 28 spells out a procedure by
which a Party may give written notice of withdrawal to the U.N. depositary after three years from
the date on which the agreement has entered into force for that Party. The soonest date the United
States may submit that intent would be November 4, 2019. The withdrawal would take effect
after one year, as soon as November 4, 2020 for the United States, or later if so specified in the
notification of withdrawal.
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States
from the PA.
61
As the PA is an executive agreement, U.S. historical practice suggests that the
President may withdraw from the PA, without prior approval by Congress, by submitting
notification of withdrawal from the PA to the U.N. Depositary.
62
Some have suggested that the United States could withdraw more quickly by exercising the right
to withdraw from the UNFCCC under its Article 25. Article 28(3) of the PA specifies: “Any Party
that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this
Agreement.”
58
Rupert Darwall, “Paris: The Treaty That Dare Not Speak Its Name,” National Review, December 14, 2015,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428448/paris-climate-agreement-bad-us-needs-congressional-approval.
59
Marlo Lewis Jr., “The Paris Climate Agreement Is a Treaty Requiring Senate Review: Why and How Congress
Should Fight President Obama’s Power Grab,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, February 24, 2016; Michael D.
Ramsey, “Evading the Treaty Power: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements Symposium: Separation of
Powers,” FIU Law Review, vol. 11 (2016, 2015), pp. 371-388.
60
Steven Groves, “The PA Is a Treaty and Should Be Submitted to the Senate,” Heritage Foundation, March 15, 2016,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/03/the-paris-agreement-is-a-treaty-and-should-be-submitted-to-the-
senate.
61
The White House, “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.” He also stated that his
Administration would seek to reopen negotiations on the PA or on a new “transaction.” The Administration has not
identified objectives, forum, or options for renegotiation of the PA or a new transaction. The responses from other
Parties to the PA have generally expressed regret for the U.S. announcement and rebuffed the proposal to reopen
negotiation of the PA. See for example, Council of the EU, “Climate Change: United States Administration’s decision
to withdraw from the PA,” Outcome of the Council Meeting, 10424/17 (provisional version), June 19, 2017.
62
CRS, Treaties and Other International Agreements, p. 208 (“[T]he President’s authority to terminate executive
agreements ... has not been seriously questioned.”). See also CRS Report R44761, Withdrawal from International
Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Stephen P. Mulligan.
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Because the UNFCCC received the Senate’s advice and consent in 1992,
63
an effort by the
executive to terminate that treaty unilaterally could invoke the historical and largely unresolved
debate over the role of Congress in treaty termination.
64
The Constitution sets forth a definite
procedure for the President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate,
65
but it
does not describe how they should be terminated.
66
There are proponents on both sides of the
debate over the executive’s power of unilateral treaty determination. On the one hand, the
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Third) concludes that the
President has the power to terminate or suspend a treaty by virtue of the executive’s powers
related to foreign affairs.
67
On the other hand, some contend that the Founders could not have
intended the executive to be the “sole organ” of treaty powers, because the Treaty Clause
expressly provides a role for the Senate formation of treaties. The Senate must, by this reasoning,
also approve the termination of a treaty that it previously ratified.
68
Given the diverse past practices and the unsettled state of the law relating to Congress’s role in
this process, it is unclear whether the executive would be required to receive congressional or
senatorial approval should it decide to withdraw from the UNFCCC. It is also unclear whether the
courts would resolve a dispute between the legislative and executive branches over termination of
the UNFCCC should a disagreement arise.
What are the roles of Congress with respect to the UNFCCC and the
PA?
Congress has power to influence U.S. commitments and performance under the UNFCCC and the
PA. As with other actions of the executive branch, Congress retains its powers of appropriations
and oversight, as well as of giving (or withdrawing) authorizations regarding implementation of
the PA.
Appropriations or prohibition of use of funds for certain purposes have been used on numerous
occasions in the context of the UNFCCC with regard to supporting the UNFCCC processes,
providing technical or financial assistance to lower capacity countries in furtherance of the
treaties, and cooperative activities of particular interest, such as enhancing monitoring of
63
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Congressional Record, vol. 138 (October 7, 1992). p. 33527. Treaty
Doc. 102-38, S. Exec. Rept. 102-55.
64
For more complete discussion of these issues, see CRS Report R44761, Withdrawal from International Agreements:
Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Stephen P. Mulligan.
65
See U.S. Constitution, Article II, §2, clause 2.
66
Scholars have also noted that the Framers never directly addressed the power to terminate treaties in the Federalist
Papers, the Constitutional Convention, or the state ratifying conventions. James J. Moriarty, Congressional Claims for
Treaty Termination Powers in the Age of the Diminished Presidency, Connecticut Journal of International Law, vol. 14
(1999), pp. 123, 132.
67
American Law Institute, “Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S.,” §338 and cmt. a (1987).
The Restatement is prepared by the American Law Institute, a private organization composed of approximately 4,000
lawyers, judges, and law professors in the United States. See Anthony S. Winer et al., International Law Legal
Research (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013), pp. 242-243. The Restatement is not binding law, but it is
generally considered persuasive authority. Ibid.
68
For a broader examination of U.S. practice with regard to the termination of treaties, see CRS, Treaties and Other
International Agreements, pp. 109-209 (“[T]he President’s authority to terminate executive agreements ... has not been
seriously questioned.”). In some cases, the United States has withdrawn from international legal agreements pursuant to
the joint action of the political branches. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
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compliance with treaty obligations or promotion of key technologies, such as carbon capture and
sequestration.
Members of Congress and their staff routinely consult with the executive branch and conduct
oversight with respect to the UNFCCC before and after multilateral sessions and while attending
as part of congressional delegations. Letters to executive officials may convey views or request
specific information, and legislative resolutions may express majority views more strongly.
Congressional hearings provide more public settings for receiving testimony and exchanges of
views with the Administration. Committee chairs have requested reviews of particular issues by
the Government Accountability Office and others. All of these may continue under the UNFCCC
and the PA.
Some key issues that may attract oversight, should the United States proceed with the President’s
intent to withdraw from the agreement include:
Options for withdrawing from the PA;
The degree and content of U.S. participation in the PA activities while the United
States is a Party and after withdrawal occurs;
69
Objectives and options for renegotiation of the PA, or of a new “transaction,”
70
should other Parties be willing to engage;
The possible implications for the United States of decisions Parties make
following U.S. withdrawal (for example, regarding technology cooperation and
trade); or
Evaluation of bilateral cooperation in areas such as development of advanced
technologies and information-sharing.
As long as the United States remains a Party, issues include the following:
Development of methods and guidance to which PA Parties will be expected to
conform concerning reporting on and achievement of NDCs;
Protection of intellectual property and opportunities for market access in
technology-related provisions;
Balancing and evaluating outcomes of appropriations, partnership programs,
regulations, and other federal activities to advance technologies, inform the
public, and influence GHG emissions and adaptation to climate change;
Use and outcomes of any appropriated funding, such as for operations of the
Secretariat, bilateral cooperation with other Parties, or the GCF; and
Overall outcomes of Parties’ actions in light of the objectives of the UNFCCC
and PA and in view of domestic concerns about potential economic and trade
implications and climate effectiveness of the agreement.
69
Representatives of the United States may participate, in a limited capacity, as an Observer in certain meetings of the
PA, as do non-governmental organizations and other approved Observers, after withdrawal.
70
Transaction was the term used by President Trump in his speech announcing his intent to withdraw the United States
from the PA.
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Countries’ Pledges to Contribute to GHG Emission
Mitigation
What did the United States pledge as its Nationally Determined
Contribution (NDC) to global GHG mitigation?
Intended NDCs (INDCs)—and, now for Parties, Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs)
71
—embody the pledges of countries to abate their GHG emissions, and, in some, to adapt
to climate change. They are thus critical to considering the overall effect of the PA. To support the
negotiations, most UNFCCC Parties submitted statements or INDCs of the contributions they
intended to make to the global effort to mitigate GHG emissions and, in some cases, adapt to
climate change. The PA requires formal, country-driven pledges from its Parties as NDCs, though
Parties are not bound to achieve the targets or take the actions the NDCs contain.
On March 31, 2015, the State Department communicated its INDC, a U.S. pledge to reduce U.S.
GHG emissions by 26-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels
72
(Figure 1). The United States
stated that it will “make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.” The U.S. INDC was not
explicitly conditional on other countries’ actions, as some other Parties’ were.
The United States noted that its INDC was supported by domestic policy actions that placed the
nation on a course to reduce GHG emissions by 17% by 2020 below 2005 levels. The INDC also
stated that the U.S. 2025 target is consistent with a straight-line emission reduction path to “deep
decarbonization” of 80% or more by 2050.
Having communicated the U.S. INDC to the UNFCCC Secretariat in 2015 before joining the PA,
the United States is considered, in accordance with paragraph 22 of the Decision, to have satisfied
the PA’s requirement to submit a first NCD under PA Article 4.2. The Secretariat has now
registered the U.S. pledge in the interim NDC Registry
73
in accordance with PA Article 4.12 and
Decision paragraph 30.
71
Unless a Party states otherwise, its INDC may be registered as its NDC. For example, the U.S. INDC is now
registered as the U.S. NDC.
72
U.S. Government, “U.S. Cover Note, INDC and Accompanying Information,” March 31, 2015,
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.
73
NDC Registry (interim), http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Party.aspx?party=USA.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the U.S. NDC GHG Reduction Pledge
Source: CRS, based on U.S. Government, “U.S. Cover Note, INDC and Accompanying Information,” March 31,
2015, http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx; and EPA, Inventory of U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2015, 2017.
Notes: These estimates are of net human-related emissions comprising gross emissions from energy and other
sectors, net removals of CO
2
from the atmosphere by “land use, land use change, and forestry,” and
sequestration of carbon in harvested wood products.
Could a Party rescind its NDC and submit a new one?
Once a government becomes a Party to the PA, its INDC may be registered by the Secretariat as
the Party’s NDC, unless the Party requests otherwise. The question has arisen as to whether, once
a Party’s NDC has been submitted and registered, that Party may rescind it and submit a new one.
This question is pertinent to the United States for several reasons. President Trump, in
announcing his intent to withdraw from the PA, stated that “this includes ending the
implementation of the nationally determined contribution.”
74
In addition, some U.S. stakeholders
have expressed concern that the ambition of the U.S. NDC GHG emission reduction target may
be too little or too great. Those seeking a less ambitious target may assert that there is not parity
in the levels of effort being contributed across countries, especially among competitive nations, or
that the costs of achieving the target may harm the U.S. economy or fossil fuel interests. Some
have suggested that the United States remain Party to the PA but rescind its NDC and possibly
submit a less ambitious substitute. These views and President Trump’s statement have raised legal
and political questions, including how to interpret related provisions in the PA.
The U.S. NDC has been registered by the Secretariat. Unless the United States rescinds its NDC,
the NDC presumably remains in effect. Its content is not binding, and, indeed, achievement of its
content could not be definitively determined until at least two years after the 2025 target date.
75
Most Parties stated their NDC with a target date of 2030; their GHG emissions data would
74
The White House, “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.”
75
The U.S. national GHG inventory must be communicated by April of each year and cover emissions of two years
prior. In other words, the April 2017 inventory covered emissions through 2015. The 2027 inventory would cover
emissions through the U.S. NDC target year of 2025 (if that remains unchanged). Subsequently, there are review
processes under the UNFCCC and potentially under the PA that must occur before questions of compliance are likely
to be raised. Under the Kyoto Protocol, questions of compliance sometimes took years to resolve.
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become available for review by Parties and the public in 2032 or later (depending on the capacity
of the country and rules developed under the PA).
Formal accounting of actions Parties are taking to achieve their NDCs would probably not be
required until the next biennial national report (BNR) under the UNFCCC is due in 2018, and
perhaps not even then. This communication is due under the Convention, not the PA, and so will
be expected regardless of U.S. intent to withdraw from the PA. The United States may expect that
other Parties will pay particular attention to U.S. explanation of its policies, actions, and GHG
trajectories, as required in such reports, when the BNR is published.
The United States may have an interest in supporting rigorous reporting and transparency under
the UNFCCC and PA and generally to be viewed as compliant with its international procedural
obligations. The United States may therefore have broader considerations than strictly the legal
terms of the PA and the UNFCCC.
There are no provisions in the PA permitting a Party to rescind its NDC or express prohibitions.
Possible withdrawal of the existing U.S. NDC raises two aspects of compliance with the PA: (1)
the requirement that each Party must submit a NDC; and (2) provisions suggesting that each NDC
must include a more ambitious pledge, a ratcheting mechanism for ambition in GHG emission
reductions.
As noted above, the U.S. NDC has already been registered. Should the United States withdraw its
NDC without submitting another, it would arguably no longer be in compliance with PA Article
4.2 as long as the United States’ withdrawal has not taken effect (in late 2020 or later). There is
no clear time by which a Party must have an initial NDC in place.
76
Deadlines may be decided by
the PA Parties as they develop rules under the PA. Subsequent NDCs must be submitted every
five years. In light of President Trump’s stated intent to withdraw, Parties may or may not pursue
non-compliance processes should the United States rescind its NDC and not submit a new one.
Article 4.3 states that “each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a
progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its
highest possible ambition.” Article 4.11 of the PA states that “a Party may at any time adjust its
existing nationally determined contribution with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, in
accordance with guidance adopted by the [CMA].” Various legal advisers and diplomatic
officials, in the United States and other countries, have asserted differing opinions regarding
whether the “ratcheting” mechanism is legally obligatory. The language appears permissive and
not prohibitive. During the negotiations, countries disagreed regarding whether Parties should be
obligated to submit NDCs that are progressively more ambitious. As is often the case in difficult
negotiations, the differences were resolved by language that may be ambiguous. Whether a less
ambitious NDC would be noncompliant would entail further legal interpretation and diplomatic
discussion among Parties. The provisions’ uses of the words will and may, rather than shall, may
undermine the argument that they could be legally mandatory. Nonetheless, a less ambitious NDC
would likely be inconsistent with the express intent in multiple provisions aimed at peaking
global emissions with reductions thereafter and could be seen as undermining the intent of the
agreement overall.
76
Should the United States rescind the existing NDC, it must either submit a new NDC or risk being considered out of
compliance. It is not clear in Article 4 or in the Decision when noncompliance might be determined, but arguably that
could be either (1) upon withdrawal of the NDC, or (2) in accordance with paragraph 25 of the Decision, nine to 12
months before the CMP in late 2018, when the CMP is due to carry out its Article 14 “stocktake” of progress under the
PA and toward the long-term temperature goals.
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The advantages and disadvantages for the United States of invoking a compliance question may
depend on expectations of diplomatic repercussions in light of President Trump’s stated intention
to withdraw from the PA.
77
It may also be influenced by the possibility that the United States
might meet the existing NDC target under expected market conditions and public policies,
including those at state and local levels, as a few observers suggest.
Can the United States meet its 2025 GHG reduction pledge?
Whether the United States will meet the GHG reduction targets in its NDC is uncertain but does
not appear likely. A Party’s achievement of its GHG emissions target is not a legal obligation but
likely has broader diplomatic and public opinion implications in the PA’s “name and shame”
compliance system. President Trump announced on June 1, 2017, that the United States would, as
of that date, “cease all implementation” of the U.S. NDC. The likelihood that the United States
would meet its target would be further reduced should the Administration’s review of regulations
(such as the Clean Power Plan [CPP]
78
) by agencies result in rescissions or more permissive
standards than those promulgated under the Obama Administration. One dozen states
79
—along
with hundreds of localities, businesses, universities, and other U.S. entities—have stated,
nonetheless, their intentions to continue efforts to reduce their GHG emissions
80
and, in many
cases, to achieve a reduction proportionate to their shares of the U.S. NDC target.
77
CRS has not identified full evaluations of the positive and negative consequences of the U.S. decision not to become
a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. The United States continued to participate after its decision not to ratify, albeit as
observers, in many activities associated with the Kyoto Protocol and with bilateral cooperation on climate change. It
did not pursue a concerted domestic strategy to attain the U.S. GHG targets set in the agreement but implemented a
number of programs aimed at reducing domestic and international emissions. Possible costs or savings have not been
assessed. Numerous reports identified adverse foreign relations repercussions following the announcement by President
George W. Bush early in 2001 that the United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. For example, it “set a bad
tone that made it difficult to work with other countries” on a host of other issues; and “Richard Morningstar, a former
ambassador, said companies that operate abroad sometimes bear the brunt of international frustration when the United
States pulls out of a deal. As ambassador to the European Union in the early 2000s, Morningstar said, he saw that
firsthand when President George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol. ‘I had many companies coming to me
criticizing our pullback from Kyoto because they were saying it made it difficult for them sometimes to operate in
various countries, because they would be told, “Why should we cooperate with you, given what the United States is
doing on climate?”’ he said. ‘That was a very real issue, and I think it would be an issue today if we pulled back from
Paris.’” Jean Chennick, “Paris Agreement: Trump Team Being Pulled in 2 Directions on Climate Pact,” ClimateWire,
February 7, 2017, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060049647. See also comment made by John Bellinger, Legal
Advisor at the State Department under President George W. Bush: “They now, I think, regret their early criticism of the
Kyoto Protocol,” Lee Logan, Inside EPA, February 1, 2017. Some commentators have suggested that the adverse
reaction of other nations to the Bush decision was temporary; the attacks on 9/11 a few months later engendered
sympathy for the United States that moderated the reaction of others to the U.S. decision. Others identify long-term
effects of the decision in other foreign policy realms in the context of a broader pattern of asserted U.S. exceptionalism
and unilateralism. See, among others, Michael J. Kelly, “The Bush Foreign Policy 2001-2003: Unilateralist Theory in a
Multilateral World, and the Opportunity for Change Offered by Iraq Policy Analysis,” Washington University Global
Studies Law Review, vol. 2 (2003), pp. 221-230.
78
EPA, “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,”
Final Rule, 80 Federal Register 64661, October 23, 2015; EPA, “Review of the Clean Power Plan,” Proposed Rule, 82
Federal Register 16329, April 4, 2017. See also CRS Report R44341, EPA’s Clean Power Plan for Existing Power
Plants: Frequently Asked Questions, by James E. McCarthy et al.
79
Office of Washington Governor Jay Inslee, “United States Climate Alliance Adds 10 New Members to Coalition
Committed to Upholding the Paris Accord,” press release, June 5, 2017, http://governor.wa.gov/news-media/united-
states-climate-alliance-adds-10-new-members-coalition-committed-upholding-paris.
80
But see also Benjamin D. Leibowicz, “U.S. Cities Don’t Need the Paris Accord to Fight Climate Change,” Fortune,
June 13, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/06/13/donald-trump-paris-climate-change-agreement-definition-cities/.
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Through 2016, several analyses indicated that the United States could meet its NDC pledge to
reduce GHG emissions to 26-28% below their 2005 levels by 2025, relying on optimistic
assumptions and additional policies.
81
Other analyses, or less optimistic assumptions, suggested
that the United States would fall short of its NDC target.
82
At the end of 2015, the United States submitted its second biennial report to the UNFCCC
83
and
itemized actions that the United States was implementing or intended to take that would assist in
reducing GHG emissions. The State Department reported that, under then-current measures only,
the United States could reduce GHG emissions (net of removals by sinks) by 12-16% below 2005
levels by 2025. This would be well short of the U.S. NDC target. Analyses by non-governmental
sources produced similar results.
84
New policies and actions of the Trump Administration could decrease the likelihood that the
United States could meet the NDC GHG target. President Trump’s Executive Order 13783,
“Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,” directed the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to review and, if appropriate, suspend, revise, or rescind,
“as appropriate and consistent with law,” the CPP and other rules that “unduly burden the
development or use of domestically produced energy resources beyond the degree necessary to
protect the public interest or otherwise comply with the law.” E.O. 13783 also withdrew President
Obama’s Climate Action Plan (CAP), among other policies.
One measure in the CAP considered important to achieving the US NDC target was EPA’s CPP,
promulgated in 2015.
85
It set standards limiting CO
2
emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired
electric generating facilities, which emitted 33% of U.S. net GHG emissions in 2015.
86
Already,
the Supreme Court had stayed the rule on February 10, 2016, under litigation challenging the rule.
EPA published notice in April 2017 that it was reviewing the CPP and, if appropriate, would
initiate proceedings, consistent with the law, to suspend, revise, or rescind the regulation.
87
The
court paused the CPP litigation for 60 days to allow EPA time for that review.
81
Department of State, “2016 Second Biennial Report of the United States of American Under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change,” 2016, https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/
submitted_biennial_reports/application/pdf/2016_second_biennial_report_of_the_united_states_.pdf. See also Karl
Hausker et al., “Delivering on the U.S. Climate Commitment: A 10-Point Plan Toward a Low-Carbon Future,” World
Resources Institute, May 2015, http://www.wri.org/publication/delivering-us-climate-commitment-10-point-plan-
toward-low-carbon-future.
82
Department of State, “2016 Second Biennial Report”; see also David Bailey and David Bookbinder, “Paris (Yet
Again) and Compliance Uncertainty,” Niskanen Center, May 2, 2016, https://niskanencenter.org/blog/paris-yet-again-
and-compliance-uncertainty/.
83
Department of State, “2016 Second Biennial Report.”
84
CRS Report R44341, EPA’s Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants: Frequently Asked Questions, by James E.
McCarthy et al.
85
EPA, “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,” 80
Federal Register 64661, October 23, 2015, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/10/23/2015-22842/
carbon-pollution-emission-guidelines-for-existing-stationary-sources-electric-utility-generating. See also CRS Report
R44341, EPA’s Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants: Frequently Asked Questions, by James E. McCarthy et
al.; CRS Report R44451, U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Trends and Projections: Role of the Clean Power Plan and
Other Factors, by Jonathan L. Ramseur; and CRS Report R44480, Clean Power Plan: Legal Background and Pending
Litigation in West Virginia v. EPA, by Linda Tsang and Alexandra M. Wyatt.
86
EPA, “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emission and Sinks: 1990-2015,” April 2017.
87
EPA, “Review of the Clean Power Plan,” 82 Federal Register 16329, April 4, 2017, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2017/04/04/2017-06522/review-of-the-clean-power-plan.
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Regarding GHG emissions from the transportation sector, the Trump Administration announced
on March 15, 2017 a reconsideration of vehicle GHG standards for the Model Years 2017-2025
that could ease or delay the emissions limits. The evaluation is due by April 2018.
88
Other new
policies designed to encourage greater fossil energy production and consumption could increase
associated GHG emissions.
The outcomes on U.S. GHG emissions of the ordered regulatory reviews and other changes in
policy remain to be seen. Many factors outside of federal policy could increase or decrease the
likelihood of meeting the target, and it is not possible to predict future emissions precisely. Some
analysts suggest that economic and technological factors may continue to reduce U.S. GHG
emissions through 2025, with a few suggesting that the NDC targets could be met through
continuing market forces along with state, local, and philanthropic programs. Plentiful natural gas
supplies have continued to offer an attractive alternative to coal-fired electricity, and falling costs
of electricity from wind and solar—along with federal tax incentives—have expanded investment
in these more advanced technologies. Any projection of future emissions is contingent on
assumptions about future economic conditions and consumer preference, the size and structure of
the energy sector, the influence of existing and new policy measures, and the modeling methods.
Strategies being undertaken by states and localities and many in the private sector could also limit
GHG emissions. Rapid technological change in the energy sector may have an even greater
influence.
Many state and local policies already constrain GHG emissions, and they will continue to
influence the U.S. emissions trajectory even under new federal policy. California proceeds with
its Advanced Clean Car Program, which included an EPA waiver to use the MY2017-2025
vehicles standards; 12 additional states have adopted the California standards. California has also
enacted laws to reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and has set a goal to reduce
GHG emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. This will require GHG reductions beyond
what was counted in earlier projections of California’s Climate Action Plan. Ten northeastern
states continue to implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative limiting CO
2
emissions,
allowing emissions trading and reinvestment of associated revenues. Many states have renewable
energy portfolio requirements, and many have stated that they will continue to pursue GHG
reduction policies, as have a number of localities and major corporations. More than 130 U.S.
cities have joined the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, pledging to abate
GHG emissions locally. A number of electric utilities reliant on fossil fuels are hedging with
investments in renewable energy generation or finding them economically competitive with the
alternatives. Many experts expect expanding deployment of advanced technologies to continue to
reduce costs and increase availability of less GHG-emitting energy systems.
Some potentially countervailing factors include the relatively low prices of motor fuels and
impacts on consumer choices and use of vehicles, relatively low operating costs of existing coal-
fired plants, electricity grid constraints, and intermittency and storage challenges of renewable
energy technologies. If natural gas prices rise significantly, or the CPP is remanded, rescinded, or
weakened,
89
the NDC targets could be especially challenging to achieve. Under most scenarios,
fossil fuels remain strongly present in the U.S. energy economy through 2030 and beyond.
88
See also CRS Insight IN10619, EPA’s Mid-Term Evaluation of Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, by
Richard K. Lattanzio.
89
See CRS Report R44480, Clean Power Plan: Legal Background and Pending Litigation in West Virginia v. EPA, by
Alexandra M. Wyatt.
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What did other major GHG-emitting countries pledge as their
INDCs?
More than 190 Parties to the UNFCCC submitted INDCs—now NDCs for Parties to the PA—that
included pledges to address national GHG emissions. Nearly all announced specific GHG targets
or actions to contribute to the evolving post-2020 regime. Some included pledges to prepare to
adapt to forecasted climate change as well.
The UNFCCC Secretariat synthesized and assessed the pledges of the 189 UNFCCC Parties—
representing about 99% of 2010 global emissions—that had submitted INDCs as of April 4,
2016.
90
The Secretariat estimated that implementation of the INDCs would result in aggregate
global emissions of 55.0 (51.4 to 57.3) gigatons (Gt) CO
2
e
91
in 2025 and 56.2 (52.0 to 59.3) Gt
CO
2
e in 2030. These estimates would be higher than the 2010 global emissions by 7-19% in 2025
and 8-23% in 2030. While these estimates indicate that GHG emissions would continue to rise to
2030, the rate of growth would be 8-23% in the period 2010-2030, perhaps cutting by 4-67%, the
24% rate of growth in 1990-2010. (The ranges of uncertainty capture a number of questions,
including how to characterize INDC pledges made conditional on, for example, financial
assistance.)
Below is a sampling of countries’ NDC pledges, mostly from large emitting nations:
92
China’s NDC included myriad policies, existing and intended, and targets for
2030:
Achieve peaking of CO
2
emissions around 2030 and make best efforts to
peak earlier;
Increase the share of non-fossil-fuel energy sources to around 20% of
primary energy supply;
Lower CO
2
emitted per unit of GDP by 60-65% compared with 2005
levels;
Expand forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters compared
with 2005 levels;
Gradually establish a nationwide carbon emission trading system; and
“Proactively” adapt to climate change.
The EU pledged to reduce its GHG emissions by at least 40% below 1990 levels
by 2030.
India stated its intention to reduce the GHG emissions intensity
93
by 33-35%
below 2005 levels by 2030, reach a 40% share of non-fossil installed electric
capacity by 2030 with help and financing, increase carbon sinks by 2.5-3 billon
90
UNFCCC, “Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: An Update.”
91
CO
2
e (also sometimes CO
2-
eq) means “CO
2
equivalents,” in which different GHG are weighted by Global Warming
Potentials (GWP) and their different impacts on forcing global temperature increase are indexed relative to carbon
dioxide, which has a GWP of 1.
92
A full set of submitted INDCs is available on the UNFCCC’s website at http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/
Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx. For more information, see also CRS Report R44092, Greenhouse Gas
Pledges by Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, by Jane A. Leggett.
93
Emissions intensity is emissions per unit of GDP.
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tons CO
2
e by 2030, and set qualitative goals to mitigate GHG and adapt to
climate change.
Mexico pledged a NDC to “peak” its GHG emissions by 2026.
Canada’s NDC stated its intention to reduce its GHG emissions by 30% below
2005 levels by 2030.
Russia offered an “indicator” of limiting GHG to 25-30% below 1990 levels by
2030, subject to “maximum possible account of absorbing capacity of forests.”
For more information, see CRS Report R44092, Greenhouse Gas Pledges by Parties to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, by Jane A. Leggett.
What if a Party does not meet its pledge?
The effect of the PA will depend both on the nonbinding pledges that Parties to it make and their
achievement of those pledges. The PA relies on good faith, transparency, accountability, and peer
and public pressure to motivate Parties’ compliance with both binding and nonbinding provisions
rather than enforcement mechanisms with mandatory sanctions. Also, Article 15 of the PA
establishes a mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the
provisions of the PA. The compliance mechanism “shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature
and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive.”
The mechanisms that best promote compliance can be difficult to predict. One treaty expert has
argued that “transparency, accountability, and precision can also make a significant difference” in
gaining compliance with a treaty.
94
It is unclear whether formal sanctions promote greater
compliance or result in less ambitious commitments. Even legally binding treaties or
provisions—and provisions for non-compliance consequences—may not succeed in gaining
compliance.
95
Some analysts have looked at experience under the Kyoto Protocol as an example:
It had provisions for enforcement, with possible punitive consequences for Parties that did not
comply with their obligations; according to some, those provisions did not visibly encourage
compliance from some Parties.
96
However, reviews and compliance proceedings raised questions
about reporting or other implementation actions of several Kyoto Protocol Parties, and those
issues were corrected or resolved during the compliance procedures.
97
These experiences of
compliance procedures may be one indication that the process may promote compliance with
procedural and technical matters.
Many states comply with treaty obligations even when there are not enforcement mechanisms.
Hence, it is difficult to conclude that the legal format of particular provisions, or inclusion of
penalties for non-compliance, would be requisite for the effectiveness of the PA. As a senior State
Department official stated, “At the end of the day, what applies in a country are the rules and the
94
Bodansky, “The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement,” Social Science Research Network, March 22, 2016,
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2735252.
95
Several Parties to the Kyoto Protocol did not comply with their legally binding, quantitative GHG emission targets,
even though formal compliance mechanisms had been agreed to in the treaty without formal consequences.
96
Achala Abeysinghe, Caroline Prolo, and M. Hafijul Islam Khan, “Compliance in the 2015 Climate Agreement,”
LDC Paper Series, November 2015. The final compliance reports for the Kyoto Protocol’s first period, 2008-2012,
however, became available in August 2016.
97
UNFCCC, Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol, “Questions of Implementation,” http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
compliance/items/2875.php.
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laws that it has to implement its obligations, its commitments.”
98
The Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee majority staff, however, expressed doubts about future compliance with
the PA:
Just because a country signs a UNFCCC agreement does not mean the agreement has any
legal effect in the country.… Countries that have signed and ratified an agreement have
the freedom to act in their best interest and withdraw…. Kyoto was legally binding and
countries still failed to comply. Non-binding targets in the Paris Agreement will not
produce any greater confidence that countries will comply.
99
Processes are taking shape to decide detailed rules to achieve the transparency and facilitative
provisions of the PA under UNFCCC and PA bodies. Government officials and public
stakeholders will likely be closely monitoring the effectiveness of those mechanisms by for the
duration of the agreement.
What effect might full compliance with the PA have on climate
change?
There are two aspects to understanding the effects of the PA on the climate system: (1)
compliance with the long-term aspects of the agreement, and (2) compliance with the pledges
made by countries only to 2025 or 2030; reporting of studies on effects of the PA often do not
distinguish between the long-term PA and the near-term GHG pledges.
According to scientific models of GHG-induced climate change, significant reductions of
cumulative GHG emissions would reduce the induced temperature increase. There is wide
scientific agreement that the more significant and earlier the GHG emission reductions, the
greater the expected effect.
100
If all countries were to comply fully with the vision and obligations
of the PA, they would reduce their aggregate net GHG emissions nearly to net zero emissions in
the second half of this century (Article 4.1), thereby stabilizing GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere. Scientists expect that near-zero GHG emissions could curtail GHG-induced global
warming and other climate changes on a multicentury timescale.
101
Article 2 spelled out a goal of
holding the increase in global average temperature to “well below” 2
o
C above pre-industrial
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5
o
C.
In principle, Parties could achieve the PA’s long-term temperature limits—but only if they ratchet
their GHG reductions at a faster rate than was reflected on average in the INDCs. The UNFCCC
Secretariat assessed that full compliance with the INDCs (mostly set to 2025 or 2030, including
98
Department of State, “Senior State Department Official on the Paris Agreement Signing Ceremony,” press release,
April 20, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/256415.htm.
99
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee majority staff, “Lessons from Kyoto: Paris Agreement Will Fail
National Economies and the Climate,” U.S. Senate, 114
th
Congress, April 21, 2016, http://www.eenews.net/assets/
2016/04/21/document_gw_04.pdf.
100
For example, the National Research Council stated that “the amount of warming expected to occur from CO
2
emissions depends on the cumulative amount of carbon emissions.... Meeting any specific emissions budget is more
likely the earlier and more aggressively work is done to reduce emissions.” National Research Council, “Climate
Change: Evidence, Impacts, and Choices,” 2011, pp 31-32, http://nas-sites.org/americasclimatechoices/more-resources-
on-climate-change/climate-change-lines-of-evidence-booklet/.
101
Initial warming of the climate system leads to further adjustments, called “feedbacks,” in the climate system. While
some feedbacks are “negative,” such as enhanced vegetation growth that may dampen warming, scientists expect
overall feedbacks to be “positive,” accelerating climate changes. To the degree that positive feedbacks dominate, it may
be increasingly difficult or improbable to curtail climate change only by stabilizing GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere.
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the conditional pledges) would show global GHG emission trajectories still rising in 2030, though
the curve could be bending significantly toward a plateau.
102
A few Parties submitted INDCs that
envisioned continued downward GHG emission trajectories to 2050, but none pledged to achieve
net zero emissions by mid-century.
The UNFCCC Secretariat presented an analysis comparing the INDCs with externally developed
GHG scenarios illustrating least-cost paths to a 2
o
C temperature limit.
103
(See Figure 2.) The
assessment concluded that the INDCs would reduce GHG emission below the pre-INDC paths
(which included policies to which countries had previously committed) and that full compliance
with INDCs would result in emission levels well above many identified least-cost paths to
achieving the temperature target:
[G]lobal GHG emissions resulting from the implementation of the communicated INDCs
are generally expected to be lower than the emission levels according to pre-INDC
trajectories, by 2.8 (0.0 to 6.0) Gt CO
2
eq in 2025 and 3.3 (0.3 to 8.2) Gt CO
2
eq in
2030.… If all conditional components of the INDCs are implemented, the resulting
global total emissions are expected to be even lower, by 3.7 (1.2 to 6.0) Gt CO
2
eq in
2025 and 5.3 (0.9 to 8.2) Gt CO
2
eq in 2030 compared with emissions consistent with pre-
INDC trajectories, while considering only the unconditional components of the INDCs
reduces the emission difference from pre-INDC trajectories to 2.1 (–0.4 to 4.3) Gt CO
2
eq
in 2025 and 2.8 (–0.4 to 5.9) Gt CO
2
eq in 2030. (paragraph 208 and footnote 65)
The gap between INDCs and least-cost paths to temperature targets well below 2
o
C or 1.5
o
C
would presumably be larger.
102
UNFCCC, “Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: An Update.”
103
Ibid., Figure 2. More specifically, the scenarios would have a 66% likelihood of an increase less than the 2
o
C
temperature limit.
CRS-30
Figure 2. Estimated Global Emission Levels Resulting from the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions in 2025 and
2030 Compared with Other Trajectories
Source: UNFCCC, “Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: An Update,” May 2, 2016 (Figure 2).
Notes: AR4 = Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. AR5 = Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC. GHG = greenhouse gas. GWP = global warming potential. HST =
high short-term target. INDCs = intended nationally determined contributions. IPCC = Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
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Next Steps for the PA
Tasks for all Parties
The PA and the COP Decision to give it effect identified numerous tasks to bring the PA into force
and help it function effectively according to Parties’ intentions. Some tasks have already begun.
The “Ad Hoc Working Group on the PA” (APA) met for the first time in May 2016 in Bonn,
Germany. The first session of the COP, serving as the meeting of the Parties to the PA (CMA 1),
was also held in Marrakech, Morocco, in November 2016, a few days after the agreement entered
into force on November 4, 2016. (See question above, “How did the PA enter into force?”)
Many Parties advocate for quick decisions by the CMA on numerous topics identified in the work
program decided in November 2016. The main elements include:
NDCs
Adaptation communications
Transparency framework for action and support
The Global Stocktake
The mechanism to facilitate implementation and compliance
The Adaptation Fund
The public registry/registries for NDCs and adaptation communications
Periodic assessments of the Technology Mechanism
Cooperative approaches under PA Article 6; and
Accounting for financial resources provided and mobilized.
(See Appendix, “Schedule for Some Key Tasks Under the PA.”) Many of those activities will
require sensitive negotiations over issues that were controversial in the lead-up to the PA.
A complete list of tasks arising from the Decision to adopt the PA is available from the UNFCCC
Secretariat.
104
Some highlights of the tasks:
The CMA is to develop guidance on the information to be submitted in NDCs so
that they are clear, transparent, and comparable.
The Secretariat established a public, interim NDC Registry containing NDCs
communicated by Parties.
105
The CMA is tasked with agreeing on guidance to ensure measurement of PA
Parties’ performance on their NDCs. Elements of this guidance may consider
criteria in the PA that NDCs should promote environmental integrity,
transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability, and consistency and avoid
double counting.
Countries were invited to communicate, by 2020, their mid-century, long-term
low GHG emission development strategies.
104
UNFCCC Secretariat, “Taking the PA Forward: Tasks Arising from Decision 1/CP.21,” March 2016,
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/cop/application/pdf/overview_1cp21_tasks_.pdf.
105
NDC Registry (interim): http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx.
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The Executive Committee of the Warsaw Mechanism was charged with
reviewing work in September 2016 to develop recommendations for integrated
approaches to avert, minimize, and address displacement of people related to the
adverse impacts of climate, and for a repository for information on insurance and
risk transfer to help Parties develop and implement comprehensive risk
management strategies.
Associated with “cooperative approaches,” the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice under the UNFCCC is tasked with developing
guidance for market-based systems that the PA recognizes will be used by Parties
to meet their NDCs. The bodies will also develop a work program for
considering other cooperative approaches, including non-market-based
approaches, to GHG emissions reductions.
The Adaptation Committee under the COP must develop methods to recognize
the adaptation efforts of developing countries and for communication of Parties’
priorities, implementation, support needs, plans, and actions and for recording
them in a registry maintained by the Secretariat.
The CMA will, in the 2020s, negotiate to set a new collective, quantified goal for
climate finance by 2025.
In addition, there will be many requests for submissions of Parties’ views, development of rules
and guidance, and reviews of existing approaches and mechanisms in the period to 2020. The
topics will include capacity building, technology cooperation, adaptation, and more.
Questions About Next Steps for the United States
President Trump’s announcement on June 1, 2017, of his intent to withdraw the United States
from the PA raises several issues regarding next steps under the PA,
106
including:
What procedure might the United States follow to withdraw from the PA?
107
Might the United States request that the PA Parties allow it an early exit from the
agreement, following customary international law, rather than the four-year
withdrawal process under PA Article 28?
Will the United States continue to participate in meetings and decisions of the PA
until withdrawal occurs, pursuant to the President’s statement that “as of today,
the United States will cease all implementation of the non-binding Paris
Accord.... This includes ending the implementation of the nationally determined
contribution and, very importantly, the Green Climate Fund”?
108
When and how may the Administration follow up on the President’s statement
that the United States would begin negotiations to reenter either the PA or an
entirely new transaction on terms that are fair to the United States”? May this
106
The White House, “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.” See also CRS In Focus IF10668,
Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, by Jane A. Leggett; and CRS
Report R44870, Paris Agreement: U.S. Climate Finance Commitments, by Richard K. Lattanzio.
107
CRS Report R44761, Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the
Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Stephen P. Mulligan.
108
The White House, “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.”
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occur within the procedures of the UNFCCC and/or the PA or in a different
forum?
How may other Parties alter their strategies and positions on implementing the
PA in light of the U.S. announcement? Or, how may the balance of influence shift
among Parties that have often shared or opposed U.S. views in negotiations?
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Appendix. Schedule for Some Key Tasks
Under the PA
Chronology
Date
Task
109
Reference in PA or
Decision
April 22, 2016
PA opens for signature at U.N. headquarters in New
York City.
May 16-26, 2016
Ad Hoc Working Group on the PA (APA) meets for its
first session in Bonn, Germany. Review begins of
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDCs), prepares for the first meeting of the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to the PA (CMA).
PA Art. 4, Art. 13, Art. 14,
Art. 15
November 4, 2016
PA enters into force, 30 days after exceeding the
threshold required of 55 ratifications or acceptances
representing at least 55% of global GHG emissions.
PA Art. 21
November 2016
COP22 and the first part of the first session of the
CMA1 held in Marrakech, Morocco: review of the
Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage, facilitative
dialogue on finance, pre-2020 ambition, and
implementation.
APA considers guidance on features of NDCs for
consideration and adoption by CMA1 and elaborate
guidance for accounting for Parties’ NDCs.
Art. 26, Art. 31
April 21, 2017
PA signature period closes. After this date, states may
become Parties to the PA by accession.
PA Art. 4.1, Art. 4.8
June 1, 2017
President Donald Trump announces intent to withdraw
the United States from the PA.
PA Article 28
2017
Review of the UNFCCC’s adaptation-related
institutional mechanisms—for reviewing the adequacy
of support for adaptation and related questions—to
prepare recommendations for actions by the CMA.
2018
Facilitative “stocktaking” dialogue on collective efforts
of Parties, in INDCs, toward the long-term goal and to
inform preparation of Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs).
November 4, 2019
Earliest date on which the United States may submit its
written notification of withdrawal.
PA Art. 28
2020
Finance: Deadline for achieving the Copenhagen/Cancun
pledge to facilitate $100 billion annually from public and
private sources.
Parties to submit new or updated NDCs.
Art. 4, Art. 22
109
An official and more thorough elaboration of the work program resulting from requests in the PA and the Decision
giving it effect (Decision 1/CP.21), along with tracking of progress, is available at http://unfccc.int/files/
paris_agreement/application/pdf/[email protected].
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Secretariat to prepare synthesis report of NDCs for
CMA.
Art. 25
2023
First global stocktake on Mitigation, Adaptation, and
Finance.
2025
PA Parties must submit first revised NDCs.
2025
Parties must set, prior to their 2025 meeting, a new
collective quantified goal for mobilizing financial
resources of not less than $100 billion annually to assist
developing country Parties.
2030
Parties submit second revised NDCs.
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